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WARNING LABELS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO YOUR
HEALTH: COMMON-LAW AND STATUTORY
RESPONSES TO ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE
MANUFACTURERS' DUTY TO WARN
INTRODUCTION
Over the years, manufacturers of alcoholic beverages have
faced sporadic products liability actions for failing to warn consum-
ers of the health risks associated with the use of their products.'
Until very recently, such manufacturers have escaped liability. State
and federal courts, in summarily dismissing charges against them,
have held as a matter of law that the adverse health effects of con-
suming alcohol are matters of common knowledge, and therefore
require no warning. 2
In December 1987, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
decided Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co. , ending the long-standing immu-
nity from civil liability enjoyed by manufacturers of alcoholic bever-
ages. In Hon, the plaintiff's husband died as a direct consequence of
1 See, e.g., Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987) (pancreatitis);
Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1982) (physical and mental injuries);
Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1986) (drunk driving); Desatnik v.
Lem Motlow Properties, Inc., No. 84 C.A. 104 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1986) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file) (acute alcohol poisoning); Pemberton v. American Distilled
Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1984) (acute alcohol poisoning); Brune v. Brown-
Forman Corp., 758 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (acute alcohol poisoning); Malek v.
Miller Brewing Co., 749 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (drunk driving); Morris v.
Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (drunk driving); Abernathy v.
Schenley Indus., 556 F.2d 242 (4th Cir. 1977) (acute alcohol poisoning), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 927 (1978).
2 See, e.g., Garrison v. Heublein, 673 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1982) ("dangers of the use
of alcohol are common knowledge to such an extent that the product cannot objectively
be considered to be unreasonably dangerous"); Abernathy v. Schenley Indus., 556 F.2d
242 (4th Cir. 1977) (no duty to warn of danger of acute alcohol poisoning under either
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or Consumer Products Safety Act), cert, denied, 436 U.S.
927 (1978); Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1986) (no duty to
warn of dangers of drinking and driving); Desatnik v. Lem Motlow Properties, Inc., No.
84 C.A. 104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (no duty to warn of
danger of acute alcohol poisoning); Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits Co., 664
S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1984) (no duty to warn of danger of acute alcohol poisoning); Malek
v. Miller Brewing Co., 749 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) ("no duty to warn consum-
ers of the dangers of alcohol, given the common knowledge of dangers involved in its
use"); Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) ("an alcoholic
beverage, in its regular form, is not unreasonably dangerous such that it would impose
the duty upon a manufacturer or a distributor of such a beverage to warn of the risks
involved with over-consumption of the product"). See infra Part II(B).
3 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 665 F. Supp.
1140 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
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consuming the defendant's beer products over an extended period
of time.4 The plaintiff brought a products liability action alleging
that the defendant's products were unreasonably dangerous be-
cause they carried no warning of the lesser-known risks of pro-
longed alcohol consumption. 5 The court held that a material
dispute of fact existed as to "whether the sale of Stroh's beer prod-
ucts with no warning was safe for its intended purpose."'6
Less than one year after Hon, Congress enacted the Alcoholic
Beverage Labeling Act of 1988 ("ABLA"). 7 The ABLA was a re-
sponse to Congress's determination that the American public need
be made aware of the many adverse health effects associated with
the consumption of alcoholic beverages.8 The ABLA requires that a
nonconfusing and nationally uniform warning notice be affixed to
the containers of any alcoholic beverage manufactured, imported,
or bottled for sale or distribution in the United States.9 The ABLA
further provides that no additional health warning statement shall
be required under state law. 10
This Note examines both the common-law and statutory re-
sponses to the question of an alcoholic beverage manufacturer's
duty to warn consumers of the potential health risks associated with
the use of its products. Part I is by way of background, summarizing
the principal dangers of alcohol use and abuse. Part II introduces
the common-law approach to the duty question by briefly setting
forth the doctrine of strict liability in tort, and then contrasting the
long-standing immunity from civil liability enjoyed by alcoholic bev-
erage manufacturers with the decision in Hon v. Stroh Brewe7y Co.
Part III argues that the common-law approach, with its reliance on
the jury, is an inadequate response to the question of an alcoholic
beverage manufacturer's duty to warn. Part IV introduces the statu-
tory approach to the duty question by briefly discussing the back-
ground and major provisions of the ABLA. Part V argues that the
statutory approach, like that of the common-law, is an equally inade-
quate response to the question of an alcoholic beverage manufac-
turer's duty to warn. As Part V makes clear, the ABLA fails entirely
4 835 F.2d at 511.
5 665 F. Supp. at 1146.
6 835 F.2d at 515. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
7 Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4518 (1988) (codified at 27 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-
219a) (West Supp. 1989)). The ABLA was part of the larger Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-
1509) (West Supp. 1989)). The effective date of the Act is November 18, 1988. 27
U.S.C.A. § 213 (West Supp. 1989). See infra note 80.
8 27 U.S.C.A. § 213 (West Supp. 1989). See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying
text.
9 Id. § 215(a). See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
10 Id. § 216. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
1989]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
as an educational and informational device; moreover, the govern-
ment warning provides only "selective" product safety informa-
tional, yet preempts all common-law causes of action for injuries
resulting from risks not addressed in the warning. Part VI suggests
that even "comprehensive" product warnings, given their societal
costs and practical limits, are of questionable efficacy. Finally, Part
VII advances an "institutionally-based" approach to the prevention
of alcohol abuse as an alternative to both the common-law and stat-
utory responses.
I
THE DANGERS OF ALCOHOL USE AND ABUSE
Alcohol abuse and alcoholism are problems of great signifi-
cance in this country."' An estimated 18.3 million Americans are
"heavy drinkers," consuming more than 14 drinks per week.12 Cor-
respondingly, the number of American adults with symptoms of al-
coholism has risen at least 8.2 percent since 1980.13 In addition to
alcoholism, there is a close correlation between alcohol consump-
tion and various other diseases. Cirrhosis of the liver, most often
caused by alcohol abuse, is the ninth leading cause of death in this
country.14 Alcohol consumption also increases the risk of cancer of
the mouth, pharynx, larynx and esophagus, 15 and is clearly related
to hypertension and heart disease.' 6 Moreover, alcohol consump-
tion during pregnancy may lead to birth defects ranging from lower
1 1 See generally DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SIXTH SPECIAL RE-
PORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH (1987) [hereinafter SIXTH SPECIAL
REPORT]; ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLICY: BEYOND THE SHADOW OF PROHIBITION (Mark H.
Moore & Dean R. Gerstein eds. 1981) [hereinafter BEYOND THE SHADOW OF
PROHIBITION].
12 134 CONG. REC. S663 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (statement of Senator Strom Thur-
mond); see also Alcohol Use and Abuse in America, 265 GALLUP REPORT 7-11 (1987)
(statistics on drinking habits).
13 134 Cong. Rec. S663 (daily ed. Feb 4, 1988) (statement of Senator Strom
Thurmond).
14 SIXTH SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at xiv. Cirrhosis is an irreversible condi-
tion with an average 50 percent survival rate after five years. Alcohol Warning Labels:
Hearings on S. 2047 Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Comm. of Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1988) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of
Enoch Gordis, M.D., Director, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism).
15 Hearings, supra note 14, at 26 (statement of Dr. Enoch Gordis). Moreover, several
studies have shown that moderate alcohol consumption by women can increase the risk
of breast cancer by as much as 50 percent. See, e.g., Arthur Schatzkin & YvonneJones, et
al., Alcohol Consumption and Breast Cancer in the Epidemiologic Follow-up Study of the First Na-
tional Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1169 (1987).
16 BEYOND THE SHADOW OF PROHIBITION, supra note 11, at 213. All available evi-
dence suggests that as much as 11 percent of hypertension in men, but a smaller per-
centage in women, may be due to alcohol consumption at a level of three or more drinks
per day. Hearings, supra note 14, at 26 (statement of Dr. Enoch Gordis).
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birth weight and subtle neurological disturbances' 7 to the debilitat-
ing physical, mental and behavioral abnormalities that constitute Fe-
tal Alcohol Syndrome.' 8
While alcohol-related motor vehicle accidents have declined,
such accidents continue to claim over 23,000 lives each year in the
United States. 19 Studies show that moderate alcohol consumption,
even at legal levels, can increase the likelihood of a fatal accident.20
Motorists whose blood alcohol level exceeds the legal limit, how-
ever, are three to five times more likely than nondrinking motorists
to be involved in a fatal collision.2'
Although there is evidence of modest declines in the use of al-
cohol by underage youth, alcohol remains the most widely used
drug among American teenagers. 22 Alcohol abuse among teenagers
has been linked to drug abuse, juvenile crime, health problems,
teenage suicide and poor scholastic achievement. 23 Moreover,
alcohol-related traffic fatalities are the leading cause of death in
young adults between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four.24
II
COMMON-LAW LIABILITY
A. In General
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth
17 Hearings, supra note 14, at 24 (statement of Dr. Enoch Gordis). Alcohol con-
sumption by men during the month before conception also has been linked to lower
birth weights in infants. Ruth E. Little & Charles F. Sing, Association of Father's Drinking
and Infant's Birth Weight, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1644 (1986) (letter to the editor).
18 Fetal Alcohol Syndrome has been observed only in the children of women who
drink heavily throughout pregnancy, and is characterized by retarded growth, distinctive
facial deformities, cranial and other skeletal abnormalities, behavioral dysfunction and
various neurological abnormalities, including mental retardation. Hearings, supra note
14, at 24 (statement of Dr. Enoch Gordis); see also SIXTH SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11,
at 80-83. Significantly, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome is the only one of the three major causes
of birth defects that is potentially preventable. See Gerald C. Goeringer & Gregory J.
Morosco, Preventing Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, 8 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD 31-32
(1983).
19 In 1987, for example, 46,386 people were killed in motor vehicle accidents in
this country. Hearings, supra note 14, at 24-25 (statement of Dr. Enoch Gordis). Of these
deaths, 23,630, or 51 percent, were alcohol-related. Id. at 25. These figures make fatal
motor vehicle accidents the leading cause of death in the United States for persons
under forty years of age. Id. at'24.
20 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FIFTH SPECIAL REPORT TO THE
U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH 95 (1983).
21 Id.
22 SIXTH SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at xiv.
23 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, POLICY RECOMMENDATION ON YOUTH ALCOHOL AND
DRUG PROBLEMS 5 (1985 & 1986 update).
24 Id.
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the standard of strict products liability in tort.25 Section 402A im-
poses strict liability for physical harm on the seller of "any product
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer,"' 26 even though the seller has "exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of the product." 27 Put another way, liabil-
ity attaches only when the product is "defective" in a way that sub-
jects persons or tangible property to an "unreasonable" risk of
harm.28
Three types of defects make a product unreasonably danger-
ous: (1) a manufacturing defect;29 (2) a design defect;30 and (3) a
warning defect. 3' Comment j to section 402A sets forth a seller's
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]
provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Con-
sumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
26 Id. § 402A(1).
27 Id. § 402A comment a.
28 Many commentators have argued that the use of both "defect" and "unreasona-
bly dangerous" is unnecessary as the term "unreasonably dangerous" is meant only as a
definition of a "defect." See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON &
DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinaf-
ter PROSSER & KEETON]; Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From
Negligence to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 598 (1980); W. Page Kee-
ton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S LJ. 30, 32 (1973); John W.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 4.4 Miss. LJ. 825, 830-33 (1973);
John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. LJ. 5, 15 (1965).
29 A product is defectively manufactured if an abnormality or flaw in the product
makes it more dangerous than intended. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 28, § 99(1);
see also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
30 A product is defectively designed if it is more dangerous than the ordinary con-
sumer would expect when using it in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or
if the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risks inherent in its use; see
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 28, § 99(3); see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 644
F. Supp. 283 (D.NJ. 1986); Barker v. Lull Eng'g. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 62 Md. App. 101, 488 A.2d
516, cert. denied, 303 Md. 471, 494 A.2d 539 (1985); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282
Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978), reh'g denied, 282 Or. 411, 579 P.2d 1287 (1978).
31 A flawlessly produced and designed product may be rendered unreasonably dan-
gerous because of the seller's failure to warn (or adequately warn) of a risk or hazard
associated with the product's use. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 28, § 99(2). See
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duty to warn of the risks associated with the use of its product.32
Comment j provides that a seller must warn only of those dangers
which are not generally known, or which one would not reasonably
identify with the product.33 Moreover, a seller is not required to
place warnings on products which are only dangerous when con-
sumed in excessive quantity, or over a long period of time, where
the danger is generally known and recognized.3 4
The reasoning behind comment j is clear. Almost all products
involve some potential risk of harm, either in their intended or rea-
sonably foreseeable use.3 5 Yet it does not follow that all products
generally James B. Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe Use in Strict Tort Liability, 13
ST. MARY'S L.J. 521 (1982). It should be noted that some courts and commentators
regard product warnings as part of a product's overall design. According to this view,
failure to warn of the potential dangers associated with the use of a product would con-
stitute a design defect. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 497-97,
525 P.2d 1033, 1038 (1974). The better approach, however, is to treat a manufacturer's
failure to warn as an independent source of liability. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
28, § 99. See generally Sales, supra.
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965) provides in perti-
nent part:
j. Directions or warning. In order to prevent the product from being
unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or
warning, on the container, as to its use. The seller may reasonably as-
sume that those with common allergies, as for example to eggs or
strawberries, will be aware of them, and he is not required to warn
against them. Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to
which a substantial number of the population are allergic, and the ingre-
dient is one whose danger is not generally known, or if known is one
which the consumer would reasonably not expect to find in the product,
the seller is required to give warning against it, if he has knowledge, or by
the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight
should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger
But a seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or in-
gredients in them, which are only dangerous, or potentially so, when con-
sumed in excessive quantity, or over a long period of time, when the
danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known and recognized.
Again the dangers of alcoholic beverages are an example ....
33 Id.
34 Id. Interestingly, comment j cites alcoholic beverages as an example of such a
product. See supra note 32 (quoting commentj). Comment i, which supplies the defini-
tion of an unreasonably dangerous product, also makes reference to alcoholic
beverages:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.
Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make
some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad
whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably
dangerous.
Id- § 402A, comment i.
35 See Victor E. Schwartz & Russell W. Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: The Need for
a Synthesis of Law and Communication Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 38, 38 (1983); see also
Hethcoat v. Chevron Oil Co., 364 So. 2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("Virtu-
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posing some risk of harm are therefore unmarketable. Rather, the
manufacturer of such products must supply the ultimate user or
consumer with enough information to make an informed choice as
to whether the product's utility outweighs its potential risks.36
B. The Long-Standing Civil Immunity of Alcoholic Beverage
Manufacturers
Manufacturers of alcoholic beverages have enjoyed a long-
standing immunity from civil liability under section 402A for failing
to warn consumers of the dangerous propensities of their products.
Both state and federal courts have held as a matter of law that the
risks associated with alcohol consumption are matters of common
knowledge, and therefore require no warning.3 7 In the language of
the Restatement, the courts have found that alcoholic beverages
marketed without warnings are not defective in a way that subjects
persons or tangible property to an unreasonable risk of harm.
Garrison v. Heublein, Inc.38a is typical of the cases holding that an
alcoholic beverage manufacturer owes no duty to warn of the risks
associated with the use of its products. In Garrison, the plaintiffs
sued the manufacturer and distributor of Smirnoff vodka, alleging
that one of the plaintiffs had "suffered physical and mental injuries
as a result of consuming the defendant's product over a twenty-year
period."3 9 The crux of the plaintiffs' claim was not that the product
was "adulterated or tainted," 40 but that the defendant had failed to
warn the consuming public of the dangerous "propensities" of its
product.4 1
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided the case
ally every machine is capable of being the instrument of hurt .... There is virtually no
part of a machine, including the ordinary electric motor and the ordinary automobile
which does not present potential dangers to a repairman.").
36 Both courts and commentators have emphasized that the consumer has a funda-
mental right to choose whether to subject himself or herself to identifiable product dan-
gers. See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121, 129-30 (9th Cir. 1968)
(recipient of polio vaccine entitled to make a "true choice judgment" whether to be
inoculated with Sabin III vaccine). In many cases, while the manufacturer cannot elimi-
nate all potential dangers associated with the use of its product, the consumer neverthe-
less can use the product safely if he or she is aware of the risks involved and acts so as to
minimize those risks. Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 38. For cases, see, e.g., Tor-
siello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 NJ. Super. 311, 325-26, 398 A.2d 132, 139-40
(manufacturer must warn consumers of the side effects of aspirin), certif denied, 81 NJ.
50, 404 A.2d 1150 (1979); Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 655, 579 P.2d 183,
187 (N.M. Ct. App.) (manufacturer required to warn of the dangers of sinus medica-
tion), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 610 (1978).
37 See cases cited supra note 2.
38 673 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1982).
39 Id. at 189.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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under section 402A of the Restatement. The court held as a matter
of law that "the dangers of the use of alcohol are common knowl-
edge to such an extent that the product cannot objectively be con-
sidered to be unreasonably dangerous." 42 The court found no duty
to warn of such commonly known dangers.43
Malek v. Miller Brewing Co. 44 is one of the most recent cases to
hold that the risks associated with alcohol consumption are suffi-
ciently known to consumers to preclude any duty to warn.45 Relying
on comments i and j of the Restatement, the Court of Appeals of
Texas concluded that the defendant "had no duty to warn and that
the product, as marketed, was not unreasonably dangerous. '46 The
court noted that "[sitatutes subjecting persons ... to criminal sanc-
tions for driving while intoxicated represent society's harshest
'warnings.' "47
C. Heralding in the New Era: Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co.
Alcoholic beverage manufacturers' long-standing immunity
from civil liability ended with the decision in Hon v. Stroh Brewery
Co.48 In Hon, the plaintiff's husband died of pancreatitis, compli-
cated with hepatic disease and gastric ulcerations 49-the direct re-
sult of his consumption of alcoholic beverages over a prolonged
period of time.50 The plaintiff sued Stroh Brewery Co., alleging that
the defendant's products were "unreasonably dangerous because
there was no warning of lesser-known dangers of prolonged con-
sumption, such as pancreatitis, as opposed to commonly-recognized
risks, such as alcoholism and liver cirrhosis."51
42 Id at 192.
43 Id.
44 749 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
45 Id. at 524. In Malek, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with a
drunken driver who became intoxicated after consuming beer manufactured by the de-
fendant Miller Brewing Company. Id. at 521-22. The plaintiffs alleged that the defend-
ant manufacturer's liability "arose from its failure to warn consumers about the dangers
of excessive beer consumption and driving an automobile, and its failure to instruct on
the safe use of its product." Id. at 522.
46 Id. at 524.
47 Id. at 523.
48 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 665 F. Supp.
1140 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
49 835 F.2d at 511.
50 Id. at 511 n.2. The record contains evidence of William Hon's drinking habits for
the six years immediately preceding his death. During that time, Hon's alcohol con-
sumption consisted mainly of Old Milwaukee Beer and Old Milwaukee Light Beer, both
products which the defendant manufacturered. Id. at 511. Hon consumed beer at the
rate of two to three cans per evening, approximately four evenings per week. Id.
51 665 F. Supp. at 1146. The plaintiff conceded that it was unnecessary "to label
alcoholic beverages as to commonly known and associated dangers and risks of harm
that result when used over a lengthy period of time or in excess .... Id. at 1142 n.3.
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The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided the case
under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Recall
that a product is defective under section 402A where it lacks a warn-
ing needed to make it safe for its intended purpose.5 2 The evidence
in Hon tended to show that the general public is unaware that mod-
erate but prolonged consumption of alcohol can lead to serious ad-
verse health effects. 53 The court therefore held that a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to whether the defendant's products were
safe for their intended purpose without a warning 5 4
At least one court already has followed Hon. The Court of Ap-
peals of Texas expressly adopted the Third Circuit's reasoning in
Brune v. Brown-Forman Corp.55 Relying on the language of section
402A, the Texas court concluded that a trier of fact could properly
find that the amount of alcohol the decedent consumed was "dan-
gerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary user of the product with ordinary knowledge common
to the community .... "56 The court then held that a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to whether tequila is safe for its intended
purpose without a warning or instruction on its use.5 7
III
THE INADEQUACY OF THE COMMON-LAw APPROACH
The decision in Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co. 58 both merits praise and
demands criticism. The court of appeals correctly recognized the
potential dangers associated with alcohol consumption and the need
to disseminate accurate information regarding those dangers. How-
ever, the court incorrectly assumed that the common-law approach
to products liability is the appropriate means by which to regulate
the dissemination of such information. The common-law approach,
52 See supra Part ll(A).
53 835 F.2d at 514.
54 Id. The district court had granted the defendant manufacturer's motion for sum-
mary judgment. 665 F. Supp. at 1142. The lower court held as a matter of law "that
defendant's beverages were not defective and that defendant was not under a duty to
warn of the dangers cited by plaintiff." Id.
55 758 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). In Brune, the plaintiff's daughter died of
acute alcohol poisoning after consuming tequila manufactured and bottled by the de-
fendant Brown-Forman Corp. Id. at 827-28. The plaintiff brought suit against the de-
fendant manufacturer, alleging that "the tequila in question contained a marketing
defect because it was an unreasonably dangerous product in the absence of a warning
and/or instructions for its safe use." Id at 828. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that
"while many risks are assumed with the drinking of a bottle of tequila, many teenagers
are unaware that the mere ingestion of the drug in excess quantity can cause an over-
dose resulting in death." Id.
56 Id. at 831.
57 Id.
58 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Hon, 665 F. Supp. 1140.
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with its reliance upon the jury, is inadequate to resolve the question
of an alcoholic beverage manufacturer's duty to warn of the risks
inherent in the use of its product. Two arguments support this con-
clusion: (1) juries may be inconsistent in finding a duty to warn; and
(2) assuming that such a duty to warn exists, juries are ill-equipped
to assess the adequacy of the warning provided.
A. Decisional Consistency
Hon was the first in a long line of decisions to question seriously
the so-called "universal recognition of all potential dangers associ-
ated with alcohol."5 9 While the court of appeals recognized that
many of the dangers of alcohol use are matters of common knowl-
edge, the court declined to rule as a matter of law that the consump-
tion of alcohol for "any extended period, no matter how short, in
any quantity, no matter how small, presents generally known dan-
gers."'60 Such a determination, the court held, is a matter best left
to the jury.6'
The court of appeals' holding in Hon has troubling implications
for what may be termed "decisional consistency. ' 62 Myriad factors,
each of which may vary from trial to trial, inform a jury's decision. 63
Allowing juries to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the risks of
alcohol consumption are generally known, and consequently
whether a particular manufacturer of alcoholic beverages has a duty
to warn of such risks, undoubtedly will lead to inconsistent jury ver-
dicts. 64 For example, one jury may conclude that Brand X alcoholic
59 665 F. Supp. at 1144 n.7. Cf cases cited supra note 2.
60 835 F.2d at 515.
61 Id. at 514.
62 As used in this Note, the term "decisional consistency" refers to the ability of
different juries to reach similar decisions in similar cases.
63 Such factors include evidence produced at trial, the demeanor of the witnesses,
the charge given by the judge and, perhaps most importantly, the psychological and
socio-economic makeup of the jury itself.
64 The threat of such inconsistent jury verdicts and their effect on products liability
insurance rates led the Department of Commerce to publish the Model Uniform Prod-
ucts Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979) ("MUPLA") in October, 1979 and to offer
it for voluntary use by the states. MUPLA sets forth uniform standards for products
liability tort law. Section 101, entitled "Findings," explicitly identifies the problems that
brought MUPLA into existence. That section provides in relevant part:
(A) Sharply rising product liability insurance premiums have created
serious problems in commerce resulting in:
(1) Increased prices of consumer and industrial products;
(2) Disincentives for innovation and for the development of high-risk
but potentially beneficial products;
(3) An increase in the number of product sellers attempting to do
business without product liability insurance coverage, thus jeopardizing
both their continued existence and the availability of compensation to
injured persons....
(B) One cause of these problems is that products liability law is
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beverages are "unreasonably dangerous" 65 without a warning while
another jury may conclude that the same brand of alcoholic bever-
ages require no warning to be safe as marketed.
Such inconsistency is particularly distressing given that alcohol
is a generic product.66 For one jury to conclude that Brand X alco-
holic beverages are "unreasonably dangerous" absent a warning
and another jury to conclude that Brand Y alcoholic beverages are
not would lead to the bizarre result of allowing recovery in the one
case, while denying recovery for harm caused by an identical prod-
uct in the other. Such a state of affairs clearly is untenable. 67
B. Assessing the Adequacy of the Warning
Where a manufacturer has attempted to warn consumers of the
risks associated with the use of its product, courts often will require
juries to determine the adequacy of the warning provided. 68 The
standard for assessing the adequacy of product warnings is perhaps
fraught with uncertainty and sometimes reflects an imbalanced considera-
tion of the interests it affects. The rules vary from jurisdiction tojurisdic-
tion and are subject to rapid and substantial change. These facts militate
against predictability of litigation outcome.
(C) Insurers have cited this uncertainty and imbalance as justifica-
tions for setting insurance rates and premiums that, in fact, may not re-
flect actual product risk or liability losses....
(E) Uncertainty in product liability law and litigation outcome has
added to litigation costs and may put an additional strain on the judicial
system.
Id.
65 RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, § 402A(l).
66 A generic product is one that relates to or is descriptive of a whole group or
class. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 617 (5th ed. 1979).
67 To avoid such inconsistency, courts might consider allowing subsequent plain-
tiffs to employ offensive collateral estoppel. For a scholarly discussion of the use of
offensive collateral estoppel in the tort context, see Kurt Erlenbach, Offensive Collateral
Estoppel and Products Liability: Reasoning With the Unreasonable, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 19
(1982); Michael D. Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill Its Promise: An
Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IOWA L. REV. 141 (1984); Douglas J. Gunn,
The Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel in Mass Tort Cases, 52 Miss. L.J. 765 (1982); Michael
Weinberger, Collateral Estoppel and the Mass Produced Products: A Proposal, 15 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 1 (1979). Courts, however, continue to refuse to apply offensive collateral estoppel
in design and failure-to-warn cases. See, e.g., Setter v. A. H. Robins, 748 F.2d 1328 (8th
Cir. 1984) (refusal to apply offensive collateral estoppel in case involving defective birth
control device); Goodson v. McDonogh Power Equip. Co., 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 443
N.E.2d 978 (1983) (refusal to apply offensive collateral estoppel in case involving defec-
tive power lawn mower). But see Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 482 N.E.2d
63, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1985) (application of offensive collateral estoppel in DES case).
68 See, e.g., Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 346, 350-51, 376 N.E.2d 143,
146 (1978); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 101, 337 A.2d 893, 902
(1975); Pearson v. Hevi-Duty Elec., 618 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). But see
Dunkin v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 124 (W.D. Tenn. 1977); Cham-
bers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 384 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th
Cir. 1977).
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the most unsettled and confusing aspect of warnings liability. 69 Not
surprisingly, juries are ill-suited for this difficult task.70
Despite the difficulties involved in evaluating the adequacy of
product warnings, few courts provide more than open-ended gener-
alities when instructing juries in this area.71 Where courts have at-
tempted to define precise standards of adequacy for product
warnings, however, their success has been limited at best. Courts
have focused on the intensity7 2 and the cost 7 3 of warnings, rather
than on the ability of the manufacturer to communicate instruc-
tional information effectively through written warnings. 74 Manufac-
turers are therefore encouraged to design legalistic warnings that
bring them within a judicially prescribed "safe harbor." 75
Adding to the confusion regarding the standard of adequacy is
the emotional context in which juries evaluate product warnings. 76
69 Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 53. Courts have attempted to define ade-
quacy in a variety of ways; see, e.g., Schmeiser v. Trus Joist Corp., 273 Or. 120, 132, 540
P.2d 998, 1004 (1975) ("[A] warning must be fair and adequate, to the end that the user,
by the exercise of reasonable care on his own part, shall have a fair and adequate notice
of the possible consequences of use or even misuse.") (quoting ROBERT D. HURSH &
HENRYJ. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8:19 at 193 (2d ed. 1974));
Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 85 (4th Cir. 1962) ("If warning of the danger
is given and this warning is of a character reasonably calculated to bring home to the
reasonably prudent person the nature and extent of the danger, it is sufficient to shift
the risk of harm from the manufacturer to the user."); Lopez v. Aro Corp., 584 S.W.2d
333, 335 (Tex Civ. App. 1979) ("Whether a warning is legally sufficient depends upon
the language used and the impression that such language is calculated to make upon the
minds of the users of the product.") (quoting Leon Green, Strict Liability Under Sections
402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1185, 1211 (1976)).
70 Note that the concerns of "decisional consistency" developed in the preceding
discussion equally apply to the question of adequacy. See supra Part III(A).
71 Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 75. For a sampling of cases, see, e.g., Kam-
merv. Lamb-Grays Harbor Co., 55 Or. App. 557, 562 n.1, 639 P.2d 649, 651 n.1 (1982)
(stating that "[e]ven if you find that a warning was given, it must be such as would rea-
sonably be expected to reach and be understood by the user."); Berry v. Coleman Sys.
Co., 23 Wash. App. 622, 596 P.2d 1365 (1979) (court need not supply guidelines to aid
jury in its determination of adequacy of product warnings); see also cases cited supra note
69.
72 See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1104 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (characterizing product warning as too "mild");
Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603, 609 (Fla. 1958) (duty to warn with enough
"intensity" to cause a reasonable man to exercise caution); Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 6
Mass. App. Ct. 346, 350, 376 N.E.2d 143, 146 (1978) ("[florcefulness of the warning
must be commensurate with the danger involved"); D'Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 125 N.J.
Super. 224, 230, 310 A.2d 106, 110 (Super. Ct. 1973) (duty to warn is not "one of clarity
but of intensity").
73 See, e.g., West v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 197 N.W.2d 202, 211-12 (Iowa
1972) (jury should consider the cost of placing a warning label on an allegedly danger-
ous product); Moran v..Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543-44, 332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975) (jury
should balance the risk of harm against the cost of product warnings).
74 Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 75.
75 Id.
76 id. at 54.
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Juries have obvious conceptual difficulties in endorsing the ade-
quacy of a warning that has not prevented an accident. 77 Moreover,
because product warnings are evaluated on an individual, case-by-
case basis, both trial and appellate courts have been reluctant to
broaden the narrow focus of such litigation to consider whether the
legal rules and their unguided application by juries will encourage
or discourage the creation of better warnings.78 The result of all
this has been to provide juries considerable leeway in compensating
an injured plaintiff out of the manufacturer's deep pocket. 79
IV
STATUTORY LIABILITY UNDER THE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE
LABELING ACT OF 1988
On November 18th, Congress enacted the Alcoholic Beverage
Labeling Act of 1988 ("ABLA"). s0 The ABLA was a response to
Congress's determination that the American public need be made
aware of the many health risks associated with the consumption of
alcoholic beverages.8' Congress decided that a nonconfusing, na-
tionally uniform warning notice would both avoid the dissemination
of incorrect or misleading information and minimize burdens on
interstate commerce.8 2 Requiring such warning notices on all
alcoholic beverage containers was, in Congress's estimation, appro-
priate and necessary in view of the substantial role of the federal
government in promoting the health and safety of the Nation's
77 Id. Professors Schwartz and Driver argue that the adequacy of a product warning
can never be determined solely by its effectiveness in preventing accidents:
No product warning, no matter how effective as a communication, can
guarantee compliance.... A warning which prevents only one percent of
the accidents associated with a product should be considered legally ade-
quate if, under the circumstances, that is all that is possible. Similarly, a
warning which prevents ninety-five percent of the accidents associated
with use of a product should be considered legally inadequate if a better
warning would have been included by a reasonably prudent manufacturer
at the time it sold the product.
Id. at 54-55 (footnote omitted).
78 Id. at 40-41.
79 See id. at 40; see also Aaron D. Twerski & Alvin S. Weinstein, A Critique of the Uni-
form Products Liability Lau--A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 232-33 (1977) (ar-
guing that juries often sustain very weak products liability cases).
80 Pub. L. No. 100-690, 101 Stat. 4518 (1988) (codified at 27 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-
219a). The ABLA was part of the larger Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1509). The effective
date of the ABLA is November 18, 1989. 27 U.S.C.A. § 213 (West Supp. 1989). In past
years, Congress and various federal agencies have considered whether to require prod-
uct warnings on alcoholic beverage containers. For a compilation of the major legisla-
tive and administrative efforts regarding such warnings, see S. REP. No. 596, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1988) [hereinafter S. REP.].
81 27 U.S.C.A. § 213 (West Supp. 1989).
82 Id.
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population.8 3
Specifically, the ABLA makes it unlawful for any person to man-
ufacture, import or bottle for sale or distribution in the United
States any alcoholic beverage8 4 unless the container8 5 of such bever-
age bears the following statement:
GOVERNMENT WARNING: (1) According to the Surgeon
General, women should not drink alcoholic beverages during
pregnancy because of the risk of birth defects. (2) Consumption
of alcoholic beverages impairs your ability to drive a car or oper-
ate machinery, and may cause health8 6 problems.8 7
The ABLA provides that the above statement shall be located in a
"conspicuous and prominent place" on the beverage container, and
shall be of a particular type and size.88 The ABLA further provides
that no additional health warning statement shall be required under
state law to be placed on any container of an alcoholic beverage, or
83 Id.
84 Section 214(1) defines the term "alcoholic beverage" as "any beverage in liquid
form which contains not less than one-half of one percent of alcohol by volume and is
intended for human consumption." Id. § 214(1). The term is obviously intended to
include distilled spirits, beer, wine, wine coolers and any similar products that may
emerge.
85 Section 214(5) defines the term "container" as the "innermost sealed container
irrespective of the material from which made, in which an alcoholic beverage is placed
by the bottler and in which such beverage is offered for sale to members of the general
public." Id. § 214(5). This section is drafted so as to ensure that the obligation to affix
the warning label to the alcohol beverage container is on the bottler, rather than on
those who only sell the product.
86 The term "health" includes, but is not limited to, the prevention of accidents. Id.
§ 214(6).
87 Id. § 215(a). Section 217 provides that if the Secretary of the Treasury deter-
mines, as a result of investigation and consultation with the Surgeon General beginning
two years after the date of the ABLA's enactment, that available information would jus-
tify a change in the government warning, the Secretary is to report that information to
Congress. Id. § 217. This section will enable the Secretary to inform Congress of recent
scientific developments so that Congress may consider the need to make changes in the
warning requirement.
88 Id. § 215(b). Pursuant to section 215(b), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms promulgated temporary regulations in February, 1989 implementing the pro-
visions of the ABLA. See Implementation of the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of
1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 7160 (1989) (to be codified in scattered sections of 27 C.F.R.).
Although effective as of February 16, 1989, the temporary regulations did not become
mandatory until November 18, 1989. Id. The regulations provide that the government
warning "shall be stated on the brand label or separate front label, or on a back or side
label, separate and apart from all other information .... " Id. at 7163 (to be codified at
27 C.F.R. § 16.21). The regulations require that the warning itself appear in "script,
type, or printing" and be at least 2 millimeters high for containers of more than eight
fluid ounces and at least one millimeter high for containers of eight fluid ounces or less.
Id (to be codified at 27 C.F.R. § 16.22(b)). The regulations further provide that all
labels "shall be so designed that the statement required by § 16.21 is readily legible
under ordinary conditions, and such statement shall be on a contrasting background."
Id. (to be codified at 27 C.F.R. § 16.22(a)).
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on any box, carton or other package that contains such a
container.8 9 The ABLA imposes a civil penalty of not more than
$10,000 for persons violating its provisions. 90
V
THE INADEQUACY OF THE STATUTORY APPROACH
Courts and commentators have long recognized the substantial
advantages the statutory approach to products liability offers over
the remedies available at common-law. 9' In general, the statutory
approach displaces the high cost and frustration of individual litiga-
tion. 92 Moreover, such an approach minimizes the "social waste"
implicit in assessing the need for improved safety standards only
upon action by an injured plaintiff.93 In addition, statutory stan-
dards greatly aid the plaintiff in the proof of his or her case. The
plaintiff may establish a claim merely by showing that the product
was within the statutory regulation, that the warning failed to meet
the statutorily prescribed standards, and that this failure caused or
contributed to the injury.94 The plaintiff therefore need not show
either that the product was dangerous, or that the manufacturer had
or should have had knowledge of this fact. Furthermore, the diffi-
89 27 U.S.C.A. § 216 (West Supp. 1989). The states retain the authority, however,
to enact legislation in other areas to protect the health and safety of their citizens from
the dangers associated with alcohol consumption. Consequently, the ABLA does not
affect other state requirements regarding alcoholic beverages (e.g., warning posters or
notices in public places). S. REP., supra note 80, at 7.
90 Id. § 218. Each day constitutes a separate offense under section 218.
91 See, e.g., Hardy Cross Dillard & Harris Hart, Product Liability: Directions For Use and
the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REV. 145, 169-77 (1955); James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial
Review of Manufacturer's Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L.
REV. 1531 (1973). But see LOUISE JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
(1965); Louise Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67
HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1954); A.D. Twerski, A.S. Weinstein, W.A. Dohaher & H.R. Piehler,
The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability--Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61
CORNELL L. REV. 495 (1976).
92 Dillard & Hart, supra note 91, at 169.
93 Id.
94 See, e.g., Crist v. Fitzgerald, 189 Va. 109, 118, 52 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1949) (The
"violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se, and if it proximately causes or con-
tributes to an injury, it will support a recovery of damages for such injury."). Absent a
specific legislative intent to occupy the field, however, statutory warning requirements
do not affect the common law duty to warn. See, e.g., Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 72 Il.
App. 3d 540, 561, 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1229 (1979) (compliance with FDA warning re-
quirements does not alter common-law duty to warn); Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 91
N.M. 651, 654, 579 P.2d 183, 186 (N.M. Ct. App.) (statutes and regulations merely set
minimum standards), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 610, 577 P.2d 1256 (1978). Therefore, even if
a manufacturer fully complies with federal or state regulations, a court may nevertheless
find the product warning inadequate. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d
1264 (5th Cir.) (polio vaccine), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); McEwen v. Ortho Phar-
maceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974) (oral contraceptive); Michael, 91
N.M. at 651, 579 P.2d at 183 (sinus medication).
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cult jury issue dealing with the adequacy of the warning actually
given is greatly simplified because statutory standards are
supplied.95
Despite its substantial advantages over common-law liability,
however, the statutory approach ultimately may do more harm than
good in the context of alcoholic beverage labeling. The statutory
remedy of the ABLA is inadequate to resolve the question of an al-
coholic beverage manufacturer's duty to warn of the hazards associ-
ated with the use of its product. Three arguments support this
conclusion: (1) warning labels in general do not qualify as a pro-
gram of public health education; (2) the government warning in par-
ticular is ineffective as an informational device; and (3) the
government warning provides only "selective" information to con-
sumers, yet preempts all common-law products liability actions for
injuries resulting from risks that require no warning.
A. Warning Labels Do Not Qualify as a Program of Public
Health Education
Research in the areas of psychology, sociology and health edu-
cation suggests that warning labels do not qualify as a program of
public health education, and therefore are ineffective as a means of
behavioral modification. 96
1. Health Belief Model
For several decades, health educators have been developing
and testing what has been termed the "Health Belief Model." 97
This Model is intended as an aid in the design of public health edu-
cation programs that are effective in preventing or reducing behav-
ior that is harmful to individuals. The Model concludes that merely
telling someone thata particular behavior is harmful will not affect
that person's conduct.9 8 The process of behavioral modification is
95 Dillard & Hart, supra note 91, at 170. See supra Part III(B).
96 For a general discussion of consumer behavior, see CONSUMER BEHAVIOR AND
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES: THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS (Stewart Henderson Britt ed.
1966); LINCOLN H. CLARK, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (1958);JAMES T. ENGEL, DAVID T. KOL-
LAT & ROGER D. BLACKWELL, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (1968); RoM J. MARKIN, JR., CON-
SUMER BEHAVIOR: A COGNITIVE ORIENTATION (1974); DIMENSIONS OF CONSUMER
BEHAVIOR (James U. McNeal 2d ed. 1969).
97 See generally Hearings, supra note 14, at 152 (statement of Dr. Ruth C. Engs, Asso-
ciate Professor, Department of Applied Health Science, Indiana University).
98 Id. The "Health Belief Model" is in this respect consistent with the theory of
cognitive dissonance developed by researchers in the field of consumer behavior. See
generally Leon Festinger & Dana Bramel, The Reactions of Humans to Cognitive Dissonance, in
EXPERIMENTAL FOUNDATIONS OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY (Arthur J. Bachrach ed. 1962);
JACK W. BREHM & ARTHUR R. COHEN, EXPLORATIONS IN COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1962);
R. MARKIN, supra note 96, at 143-62 (1974); James U. McNeal, Cognitive Dissonance and
Consumer Behavior, in DIMENSIONS OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, supra note 96. The theory of
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infinitely more complex. Under the Model, the individual must (1)
feel personally susceptible to the health problem; (2) feel that the
problem can cause he or she serious harm; (3) know what actions
can be taken to avoid the harm; and (4) know the costs or benefits of
these actions. 99
When viewed in the context of the Health Belief Model, the
warning mandated by the ABLA fails entirely as a means of public
health education. The warning does not indicate how an individual
is personally susceptible to the harms noted. Moreover, the warn-
ing neglects to outline possible means of avoiding such harms.
What the warning does do is introduce a set of harms that may or
may not affect those who consume alcohol in some undescribed
quantity over some unnamed period of time.100 Such a warning is
not only uneducational, but may not even be credible.
2. Fear Arousal Techniques
Research has shown that fear arousal techniques (i.e., "scare
tactics") are an ineffective means of modifying behavior, and in par-
ticular, abusive health behavior. 01 In some cases, such techniques
may even be counterproductive. 102 A written warning that induces a
state of fear in the reader may cause him or her to feel overly
threatened, and as a result, to reject the personal relevance of the
cognitive dissonance is predicated upon the assumption that each individual strives to-
ward consistency among his opinions, attitudes and values. See R. MARKIN, supra note
96, at 145. The theory predicts that consumers generally expose themselves to informa-
tion which is consonant with their existing attitudes and beliefs, and avoid information
which may be irritating or dissonant. Id.
99 Hearings, supra note 14, at 152 (statement of Dr. Ruth C. Engs).
100 See id.; see also id. at 88 (statement of W. Kip Viscusi, George G. Allen Professor of
Economics, Department of Economics, Duke University).
101 See, e.g., R. MARKIN, supra note 96, at 327 ("Fear appeals have been shown to be
less effective in persuading the audience to certain prescribed attitudes and behavior
than appeals that are tempered with reason and more calmly emphasize a given
threat."); Michael L. Ray & William L. Wilkie, Fear: The Potential of an Appeal Neglected by
Marketing, 34J. MARKETING 54 (1970); John L. Wheatley, Marketing and the Use of Fear-or-
Anxiety-Arousing Appeals, 35 J. MARKETING 62 (1971). Significantly, research has shown
that attempts to alter attitudes or modify behavior through fear arousal techniques are
effective only with respect to those individuals who do not perceive themselves as the
targets of such attempts. See Ray & Wilkie, supra, at 59.
102 For example,
telling teenagers that they should not have sex until they are married be-
cause they might get pregnant or catch a sexually transmitted disease has
had little effect on teenage pregnancies or disease rates. Teenagers who
have had sex a few times and have not become pregnant or diseased, or
who have not caused someone else to become so, do not believe the
threatening message, or feel that it does not apply to them. Because they
do not believe it, they continue to have sex, resulting in our country hav-
ing one of the highest rates of teenage pregnancies in the industrialized
world.
Hearings, supra note 14, at 152 (statement of Dr. Ruth C. Engs).
174 [Vol. 75:158
1989] NOTE-WARNING LABELS 175
warning entirely.'0 3 Moreover, if the content of the warning con-
flicts with the individual's personal experience, it is likely that the
warning will lose all credibility. 104
The warning mandated by the ABLA uses fear arousal tech-
niques in an attempt to modify behavior. The caveat against con-
suming alcoholic beverages during pregnancy because of the risk of
birth defects is exemplary. Such a fear-inducing warning may cause
some women to become defensive and to reject not only the infor-
mational content of the warning, but also that of any well-designed
public health education program. 10 5
3. Reactance Theory
The basic premise of reactance theory is that individuals value
their sense of freedom and autonomy, and seek to project an image
of self-control.106 Reactance theory suggests that whenever an indi-
vidual's freedom is threatened, that individual enters into a "reac-
tance motivational state" and acts to regain control. 10 7 Accordingly,
attempts to bring about conformity in behavior often result in oppo-
sition and noncompliance.10 8
103 Id.
104 Dillard & Hart, supra note 91, at 162. For cases, see, e.g., Farley v. Edward E.
Tower & Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930) (warning on plastic hair comb insuffi-
cient); Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945) (plaintiff ignored warn-
ing where the name of the product was "Safety-Kleen"). The effect of a group of
psychological phenomena known as "selective exposure," "selective perception" and
"selective retention" on the communication process is well summarized by Professor
Markin in his much read book on consumer behavior:
Not only do we selectively expose ourselves to the media, messages, and
appeals that support our predispositions, but we perceive what we want
to perceive. Media messages and appeals that are in conflict with our
norms of behavior and our predispositions are converted, in the event of
exposure, to positions more nearly compatible with our own. We tend to
see, hear, and believe only those things that we wish to see, hear, and
believe. Finally, our predispositions induce us to retain only what is con-
gruent or compatible with our life style.
R. MARIN, supra note 96, at 321. For well-documented examples of and research into
these phenomena, see BERNARD BERELSON & HAZEL GAUDET, THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE
(1948).
105 Hearings, supra note 14, at 153 (statement of Dr. Ruth C. Engs).
106 See R. MARKIN, supra note 96, at 407; Hearings, supra note 14, at 153 (statement of
Dr. Ruth C. Engs).
107 R. MARGIN, supra note 96, at 407. Accord Hearings, supra note 14, at 153 (statement
of Dr. Ruth C. Engs).
108 R. MARKIN, supra note 96, at 407. This point is well supported by recent studies
documenting alcohol consumption among college students. See Hearings, supra note 14,
at 153. The results of these studies are summarized by Dr. Engs:
Despite the prohibition against drinking by students younger than 21, a
higher percent of underage students drank compared to those of legal
age and a higher percent were heavy drinkers and exhibited several other
alcohol abuse problems compared to students of legal age . ...
[P]rohibiting drinking among these underage students may have been
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
Some may interpret the warning mandated by the ABLA as a
threat to their autonomy and freedom to drink. Reactance theory
suggests that such a warning will be counterproductive, in that con-
sumers are likely to do exactly that which they are warned against-
they will consume alcoholic beverages irrespective of, and oblivious
to, the risks involved.
B. The Government Warning Is an Ineffective Informational
Device
To be effective as an informational device, a warning must con-
vey new knowledge in a persuasive manner.109 Past informational
campaigns such as those intended to encourage seatbelt use and to
deter cigarette smoking have had limited success.'1 0 The primary
purpose of those efforts was to exhort, rather than to provide con-
seen as a restriction of freedom and autonomy, thereby leading to more
drinking and abuse compared to the legal drinkers. Also directly relevant
may be the fact that most states require warning signs in liquor stores and
taverns that it is illegal for minors to purchase alcohol.
Id.; cf M. Venkatesan, Experimental Study of Consumer Behavior, 3J. MARKETING RES. (1966)
(individuals exposed to group norm and induced to comply were less responsive than
individuals who were not induced to comply).
109 W. KIP VIScUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND
WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 24 (1987). See, e.g., Ellis v. International
Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1984) (tampon necessitated warning of
toxic shock syndrome); Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 404 (ist
Cir. 1965) (warning required skull and crossbones); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio
St. 2d 192, 198, 423 N.E.2d 831, 837 (1981).
Courts often impose the further requirement that manufacturers use the best possi-
ble means available to inform consumers of the dangers associated with the use of their
products. See, e.g., Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 162 (D.S.D. 1967)
(although manufacturer advised physicians of product's risk by means of a series of
product cards, a letter and the Physician's Desk Reference Book, warning efforts held
inadequate because manufacturer did not require those persons employed in the pro-
motion and sale of its products to inform physicians of possible side effects), aff'd, 408
F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969). Cf. Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 288-89, 282 A.2d 206,
220 (1971) (although drug manufacturer included sufficient warnings on package label,
manufacturer's salesmen rendered warnings insufficient by overemphasizing the effec-
tiveness of the drug while underemphasizing its risks).
110 Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act in 1965. Pub. L. No. 89-
92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40). The Act re-
quired the following legend to appear on all cigarette packages: "Caution: Cigarettes
May Be Hazardous To Your Health." Pub. L. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat. 282, 283 (1965) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1965 & Supp. V 1969)). In 1970, Congress amended the Fed-
eral Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, requiring that the legend read: "Warning:
The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous To Your
Health." Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 88
(1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970)). The Act also barred radio and television
advertising. Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 89 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1335
(1970)). Statistical evidence of cigarette consumption patterns indicates that both per
capita and total consumption increased after the warning labels were instituted and the
broadcast ban went into effect. See Camille P. Shuster & Christine Pacelli Powell, Com-
parison of Cigarette and Alcohol Advertising Controversies, 16J. ADVERTISING 26, 27 (1987).
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sumers with new and meaningful information." 1 The lack of major
consumer response is therefore not surprising.
In terms of substantive and persuasive merit, the warning man-
dated by the ABLA is of questionable efficacy. The consuming pub-
lic is generally aware of the dangers of drinking and driving."12
Similarly, the risks to pregnant women who consume alcohol are
matters of common knowledge. 1 3 The government warning there-
fore appears largely intended to frighten consumers into modifying
their behavior, rather than provide them with any new and useful
information. As a result, the warning is unlikely to serve a construc-
tive purpose.
C. The "Selective Approach" of the Government Warning
The ABLA adopts a "selective approach" to warning labels.
Although myriad health hazards are associated with the consump-
tion of alcoholic beverages, 114 the government warning addresses
only those hazards which Congress apparently considers to involve
the most risk."15 While generally desirable and perhaps unavoida-
ble, 116 selective product warnings are not without their costs.
I11 Even the most recent statutorily mandated warnings for cigarette packages fail to
provide consumers with any new and meaningful information regarding the potential
health hazards associated with cigarette smoking. See Comprehensive Smoking Educa-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 98-74, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41
(1988)) (effective October 12, 1985). The Comprehensive Smoking Education Act re-
quires that the following four rotational warnings appear on cigarette packages:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Can-
cer, Heart Disease, Emphysema And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now
Greatly Reduces Serious Risks To Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women
May Result In Fetal Injury, Premature Birth And Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains
Carbon Monoxide.
15 U.S.C. § 1333. Such warnings fail to inform consumers that smoking nearly doubles
one's risk of heart disease, that smokers are between ten and twenty-five times more
susceptible to lung cancer than are non-smokers, and that between seventy and eighty
percent of all deaths caused by emphysema and chronic bronchitis are attributable to
smoking. See Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report on the Cigarette Advertising In-
vestigation, ch. 1 at 11-31 (May 1981).
112 Newspaper coverage of the dangers of drinking and driving has risen by a factor
of more than thirty in the past decade. Hearings, supra note 14, at 87 (NEXIS count of
Associated Press stories).
113 A special Gallup Report on alcohol use and abuse in America indicated that 90
percent of the population agrees that "[t]he use of alcohol by pregnant women can
cause birth defects." GALLUP REPORT, supra note 12, at 25 (1987). Comparison of these
results with those of a 1982 survey shows an increase either in overall public under-
standing or in the strength with which those views are held. Id. at 24.
114 See supra Part I.
115 See supra text accompanying note 87 (quoting government warning).
116 See infra Part VI.
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Where the consumer is warned only of selected risks, he or she may
remain unaware of other risks not included in the product warn-
ing.'1 7 Indeed, the consumer may mistakenly believe that those
risks identified in the warning are the only risks associated with the
use of the product. 118 Such misreliance on a selective warning may
lull the consumer into being inattentive or careless, and therefore
increase the potential for injury.1 19
The selective approach of the ABLA is especially distressing
when viewed in the light of the Act's preemption provision. Section
216 of the ABLA provides:
No statement relating to alcoholic beverages and health,
other than the statement required by section 215 of this title, shall
be required under State law to be placed on any container of an
alcoholic beverage, or on any box, carton, or other package, irre-
spective of the material from which made, that contains such a
container. 120
This section, while admittedly furthering Congress's goal of na-
tional uniformity,1 21 may be read to preempt all common-law prod-
ucts liability actions for injuries caused by risks not addressed in the
government warning.' 22 With respect to this issue, the experience
of injured plaintiffs under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Ad-
vertising Act 123 is especially instructive. In the past three years
117 Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 61. Courts frequently hold warnings ade-
quate in substance only where they are comprehensive as to both the nature and severity
of the risks associated with a product's use. See, e.g., Ellis v. International Playtex Inc.,
745 F.2d 292, 306-307 (4th Cir. 1984) (tampon required warning of toxic shock syn-
drome); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 85 (4th Cir. 1962) (warning on furni-
ture polish insufficient to inform consumers of danger of ingestion); Tucson Indus. v.
Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 468-69, 501 P.2d 936, 940 (1972) (warning on contact cement
insufficient to alert consumers that product gave off toxic fumes which might cause
blindness to people in adjoining rooms without proper ventilation); Rumsey v. Freeway
Manor Minimax, 423 S.W.2d 387, 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (warning on roach poison
inadequate because it did not inform consumers that there was no antidote once poison
absorbed into the bloodstream); Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859, 867 (Mo.
1958) (warning that paint is irritating to skin insufficient to alert consumers of potential
injury to sight if paint comes into contact with eyes).
118 Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 61. See cases cited supra note 117.
119 Id. It is worth noting that as the length of the message decreases, so must its
specificity. The more general the warning, however, the greater the possibility of ambi-
guity, and the more likely the behavioral response elicited will differ from that intended.
Id at 61 n.I 10. See, e.g., Johnson v. Husky Indus., 536 F.2d 645, 649 (6th Cir. 1976);
Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089, 1096 (5th Cir. 1973).
120 27 U.S.C.A. § 216 (West Supp. 1989).
121 See id. § 213; see also supra text accompanying note 82.
122 See generally supra note 94.
123 Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-40). The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act was subsequently
amended in 1970 by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
222, 84 Stat. 88 1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970)), and again in 1984 by the
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alone, four separate United States Courts of Appeals have held that
the preemption provision of that Act-with language nearly identi-
cal to that of section 216 of the ABLA124-preempts state law prod-
ucts liability actions for inadequate or ineffective warnings, where
the warning provided complies with the statutory requirements. 125
Recall that the government warning provides consumers with
no new and convincing information. 126 Should the ABLA prove to
preempt all state law products liability actions against manufactur-
ers of alcoholic beverages for warning defects, plaintiffs injured as a
result of risks not included in the government warning, and of which
they were unaware, would in effect be left remediless. The inequity
of such a result is striking.
VI
COMPREHENSIVE WARNINGS: AN UNWORKABLE
ALTERNATIVE
Comprehensive warnings at first glance may appear to be an
effective and easy solution to the problems respecting selective
warnings. The unexamined premise that comprehensive warnings
are not costly, however, is highly questionable. 127 When estimating
the burden of supplying adequate product warnings, it is necessary
to focus on costs other than those of label printing. 128 Often over-
Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-74, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)) (effective October 12, 1985).
124 Section 1334 of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, entitled
"Preemption," provides:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the
statement required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any
cigarette package.
15 U.S.C. § 1334(a). Unlike the preemption provision of the ABLA, section 1334 also
preempts state law with respect to requirements or prohibitions on the advertising and
promotion of cigarettes. It provides:
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or pro-
motion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity
with the provisions of this chapter.
Id. § 1334(b).
125 See Roysdon v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988); Ste-
phen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620
(1st Cir. 1987); see also Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 685 F. Supp. 15 (D. Mass.
1988); Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
126 See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
127 See Twerski, Weinstein, Dohaher & Piehler, supra note 91, at 514-17.
128 Id. at 517. Courts face a unique problem when called upon to decide whether a
product is unreasonably dangerous without a warning. A court must balance the
probability and gravity of harm if care is not exercised against the cost of taking appro-
priate precautions. Id. at 514. For cases doing this, see, e.g., Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co.,
835 F.2d 510, 512 (3d Cir. 1987) ("The court must thus balance the product's social
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looked are the societal costs of overwarning and the practical limits
to a rule of full disclosure.
A. Societal Costs of Overwarning
The societal costs of overwarning are important limitations on
the length and comprehensiveness of a product warning. 129 To be
effective, warnings must be both selective 30 and credible. They
must call to the consumer's attention only those risks which are sig-
nificant and probable. 13' Requiring consumers to guard against
trivial or remote risks will result only in confusion and in an inability
to assimilate information concerning more important risks.' 3 2
Moreover, consumers who consider one of the risks included in a
product warning trivial or remote are likely to discount the impor-
tance of the other risks similarly addressed. 133
The societal costs of overwarning are especially distressing
utility against its unavoidable risk to determine whether the condition of the product
could be labeled 'unreasonably dangerous' and the risk of loss placed on the manufac-
turer."); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., Inc., 391 A.2d 1020, 1025-27 (Pa. 1978). Many
courts and commentators have argued that such a cost-benefit analysis seldom can jus-
tify the absence or inadequacy of product warnings. See, e.g., Hon, 835 F.2d 510; Moran
v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975); Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at
38-39. The attitude of the court in Moran is not atypical:
[W]e observe that in cases such as this the cost of giving an adequate
warning is usually so minimal, amounting only to the expense of adding
some more printing to a label, that this balancing process will almost al-
ways weigh in favor of an obligation to warn of latent dangers, if the man-
ufacturer is otherwise required to do so.
273 Md. at 543-44, 332 A.2d at 15. According to this view, the cost of almost any seri-
ous injury will therefore justify the minor expense of supplying warnings. But see Twer-
ski, Weinstein, Dohaher & Piehler, supra note 91, at 514-17.
129 See generally Twerski, Weinstein, Dohaher & Piehler, supra note 91, at 514-17.
130 This statement may at first glance appear to contradict the argument made ear-
lier that the ABLA, although at heart a rule of limited disclosure, is inadequate to re-
solve the question of an alcoholic beverage manufacturer's duty to warn of the hazards
associated with the use of its product. See supra Part V(C). Recall, however, that the
ABLA is ineffective not because its approach is selective, but because section 205 of the
Act (codified at 27 U.S.C.A. § 216 (West Supp. 1989) preempts all common-law prod-
ucts liability actions for injuries caused by risks not addressed in the government warn-
ing. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
131 Twerski, Weinstein, Dohaher & Piehler, supra note 91, at 514. For a classic illus-
tration of the societal costs of overwarning, see Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538,
332 A.2d 11 (1975) (cologne manufacturer required to warn of product's combustibil-
ity). See supra note 128.
132 Wesley A. Magat, W. Kip Viscusi & Joel Huber, Consumer Processing of Hazard
Warning Information, I J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 201, 229 (1988). See generally James R.
Bettman, John W. Payne & Richard Staelin, Cognitive Consideration in Designing Effective
Labels for Presenting Risk Information, 5 J. MARKETING & PUB. POL'v 1-28 (1986); JAMES R.
BETrMAN, AN INFORMATION PROCESSING THEORY OF CONSUMER CHOICE (1979).
133 Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 59; see also Hearings, supra note 14, at 89
("Some consumers will be unduly alarmed, and others may dismiss [the government
warning] altogether because warning information that makes no distinctions regarding
the amount of usage is not credible.") (statement of Professor W. Kip Viscusi).
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when viewed in the aggregate. If a significant number of products
were to carry lengthy and comprehensive warnings, all warnings
would become less effective.134 Were every possible risk in life ac-
companied by a warning, consumers would become so precondi-
tioned to the existence of such warnings that warnings would no
longer be meaningful.' 35 Indeed, consumers would eventually ig-
nore warnings entirely.
The societal costs of overwarning are also important from a
legal perspective. It is not uncommon for a court to hold a manu-
facturer liable for failing to warn of an obvious or extremely remote
risk associated with its product.' 3 6 In such cases, courts generally
have focused on the particular hazard that caused the plaintiff's in-
jury, and not the full panoply of possible hazards.' 37 It may there-
fore be said that "the legal system's apparent preference for
comprehensive warnings is less the result of a considered evaluation
of the warnings problem than the net effect of hundreds of narrowly
focused products liability cases."' 38 Manufacturers are in this re-
spect encouraged to design legalistic warnings intended to escape
liability, rather than to prevent accidents.' 3 9
134 Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 60; see also Hearings, supra note 14, at 90 ("If
individuals are warned about hazards through overly broad warning labels that lack be-
lievability then these efforts diminish the credibility of all warnings programs. Individu-
als who see similar warnings for other products will draw the conclusion that they are no
more valid than the warnings for alocholic [sic] beverages and will consequently assess a
low level of risk.") (statement of Professor W. Kip Viscusi).
135 See Hethcoat v. Chevron Oil Co., 364 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). As
the court in Hethcoat stated:
To hold that every part subject to repair at grave risk must have a posted
warning would result in an impossible and even undesirable situation.
One wonders, for instance, where the warning should be posted on a bi-
cycle chain subject to severing the fingers of a repairman; the gas tank of
an automobile subject to exploding while in the process of repair; the
electric motor on all sorts of household devices (blenders, dishwashers,
washing machines, air conditioners, etc.) subject to electrocuting a re-
pairman if the current is not cut off.
Id. at 1244-45.
136 See, e.g., Hethcoat, 364 So. 2d 1243; Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332
A.2d 11 (1975) (cologne manufacturer required to warn of product's combustibility);
Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 517, 476 P.2d 713, 719 (1970)
("[T]he manufacturer of the obviously defective product ought not escape because the
product was obviously a bad one."). Cf Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 382-86,
348 N.E.2d 571, 575-77, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 119-21 (1976) (questioning Campo v.
Scofield, 30 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950), the leading case standing for the proposi-
tion that there is no recovery for patent dangers). But see Jamieson v. Woodward &
Lothrop, 101 U.S. App. D.C. 32, 37-38, 247 F.2d 23, 28-29 (recovery denied where
elastic exerciser slipped off purchaser's foot and injured eye), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855
(1957); Zidek v. General Motors, 66 Ill. App. 3d 982, 985, 384 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1978)
(no duty to warn that tires will skid on wet pavement).
137 Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 60.
138 Id. at 60-61 n.108.
139 Id. at 60. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
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B. Practical Limits
Almost all products involve some degree of danger, even when
properly used.1 40 Many products pose a variety of potential risks.
Not surprisingly, the information necessary to warn about those
risks can be complex and voluminous. When the optimal medium
for communicating such warnings is the product itself, a compre-
hensive warning is clearly impracticable. 141 In such circumstances,
however, the use of an overly selective warning may be ineffective,
misleading and potentially dangerous.' 42
Even when feasible, a comprehensive warning may not be desir-
able. Typically, a consumer encounters a product warning just
before using the product.1 43 Because the consumer is unlikely to
postpone his or her use of the product, the warning must be com-
municated in a relatively short period of time. When the consumer
is presented with too much information, however, comprehension
generally suffers. 144 Indeed, an "encyclopedic" warning may dis-
courage a consumer from even attempting to assimilate its con-
tent. 145 Such practical concerns limit the amount of information
that can be communicated effectively in a product warning.
VII
THE INSTITUTIONALLY-BASED APPROACH: A PROPOSAL FOR
THE FUTURE
Warning labels are limited with respect to the kinds and
amounts of information they can adequately convey. Where the
goal is to inform the American public about the risks associated with
alcohol consumption, warning labels have proven to be an inade-
quate information transfer mechanism. This Note proposes, as an
alternative, an "institutionally-based" approach to the prevention of
140 See supra note 35.
141 See Hethcoat v. Chevron Oil Co., 364 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978); see also Hearings, supra note 14, at 89 (information necessary to inform consumers
of the causal links between alcohol consumption and birth defects, cancer and other
similar health disorders is too lengthy and complex for a short alcoholic beverage label)
(statement of Professor W. Kip Viscusi).
142 Schwartz v. Driver, supra note 35, at 58 n.96.
143 Labels are most useful as a warning device in situations where reading the label
is an essential part of using the product. Consumers need not read the government
warning in order to drink an alcoholic beverage, and in many cases do not even see the
container during their use of the product.
144 See generally COLIN MARTINDALE, COGNITION AND CONSCIOUSNESS, 1-12 (1981);
ARNOLD LEWIS GLASS, KEITH JAMES HOLYOAK, COGNITION 25-56 (1979). For a general
discussion of consumer processing of product warning information, see W. Viscusi &
W. MAGAT, supra note 109; Bettman, Payne & Staelin, supra note 132, at 1-28; Magat,
Viscusi & Huber, supra note 132.
145 Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 59.
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alcohol abuse and alcoholism. Such an approach is well supported
by basic communications theory.
A. The Institutionally-Based Approach
Social institutions do much to shape public attitudes toward al-
cohol use and abuse. 146 Among those institutions particularly
adapted to this purpose are schools at all levels, hospitals and other
health maintenance organizations, and the media. Such institutions
have constant access to and impact on the American public. Indeed,
their scope and resources are such that they dwarf the efforts of
public health educators and others attempting to modify individual
behavior. 147
To effectively educate consumers about the dangers of alcohol
consumption and thereby influence their drinking habits would re-
quire the dissemination of accurate product safety information by
no less than all of the aforementioned social institutions. A success-
ful health education and training program must therefore combine a
carefully designed mass media information campaign with personal-
ized behavioral training provided through schools, hospitals and
various other health maintenance organizations. 148 The main goals
146 See generally James F. Mosher & David H. Jernigan, Public Action and Awareness to
Reduce Alcohol-Related Problems: A Plan of Action, 9 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 17 (1988)
("changing the institutional environment around alcohol must be a priority for preven-
tion efforts"); BEYOND THE SHADOW OF PROHIBITION, supra note 11, at 79-99; John L.
Hochheimer, Reducing Alcohol Abuse: A Critical Review of Educational Strategies, in BEYOND
THE SHADOW OF PROHIBITION, supra note 11; H. T. Blane & L. E. Hewitt, Mass Media,
Public Education and Alcohol: A State-of-the-Art Review (1977) (final report prepared
for the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism).
147 See Mosher &Jernigan, supra note 146, at 17.
148 The Three Community Study of the Stanford Heart Disease Prevention Project
serves as a model for such a program. See generally Nathan Maccoby, John W. Farquhar,
Peter D. Wood & Janet Alexander, Reducing the Risk of Cardiovascular Disease: Effects of a
Community Based Campaign on Knowledge and Behavior, 3 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 100-114
(1977) (analyzing the Three Community Study); J. Hochheimer, supra note 146, at 286-
335 (discussing various studies); STEV OLSON & DEAN R. GERSTEIN, ALCOHOL IN
AMERICA: TAKING ACTION TO PREVENT ABUSE 90-91 (1985) (describing the Three Com-
munity Study); Nathan Maccoby &John W. Farquhar, Communication for Health: Unselling
Heart Disease, 25 J. COMM. 114-126 (1975). The Three Community Study was designed
to determine whether state-of-the-art programming of the mass media in connection
with intensive interpersonal training would be effective in modifying behaviors known to
contribute to the risk of heart disease. Three towns in central California, each with a
population of approximately 13,000, were selected. One town received health messages
solely through the media; a second town received health messages through both the
media and through an intensive program of personal instruction for high risk cases; the
third town served as a control. The results of the Three Community Study were
striking:
Surveys and medical examinations were undertaken after one, two and
three years of the campaign. As might be expected, those receiving in-
tensive training in addition to the media campaign showed the sharpest
initial reduction in risk. By the end of two years, however, the town re-
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of such a program would be to (1) generate awareness about the
program and its focus; (2) increase the public's knowledge of the
risks associated with alcohol consumption; (3) motivate consumers
to adopt new behaviors such as low risk drinking and abstention;
and (4) reinforce those newly learned behaviors so that consumers
will maintain them. Such an "institutionally-based" approach would
be more effective in reaching individuals and changing their behav-
ior than the simplistic solution of printed warning labels on alco-
holic beverage containers.
The institutionally-based approach to health education, with its
emphasis on "counteradvertising,"' 49 is also more effective and
raises fewer constitutional issues than state and federal bans on al-
coholic beverage advertising. °50 Proponents of such bans fre-
quently cite a 1981 study by Atkin and Block purporting to find a
ceiving health messages through the media only had caught up with the
community including the intensive instruction group. When overall risk
of heart disease was calculated, participants showed reductions of be-
tween 16 and 18 percent after two years. In the town that received no
educational campaign, the average risk had increased by 6.5 percent.
There was some retrogression during the third year in the mass-media-
only town when educational programming was sharply curtailed, but not
in the mass-media town that included intensive instruction. Apparently
the supplemental value of face-to-face instruction has more staying
power.
BEYOND THE SHADOW OF PROHIBITION, supra note 11, at 94-95.
149 Unlike a ban, counteradvertising seeks to reduce alcohol abuse by educating the
public about the potential dangers of alcohol consumption. Counteradvertising is there-
fore consistent with the first amendment tradition of shouting down inaccurate informa-
tion rather than suppressing it. See Comment, Alcoholic Beverage Advertising on the Airwaves:
Alternatives to a Ban or Counteradvertising, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1139, 1181-90 (1987) (au-
thored by Steve Younger).
150 The constitutionality of such bans has generated much debate in the law reviews
and journals. See, e.g., Gary B. Wilcox, Dorothy Shea & Roxanne Hovland, Alcoholic Bev-
erage Advertising and the Electronic Media, 8 COMM. & L. 31 (1988); Comment, supra note
149; Comment, The First Amendment and Legislative Bans of Liquor and Cigarette Advertise-
ments, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 632 (1985) (authored by Mathew L. Miller); Comment, Re-
straints on Alcoholic Beverage Advertising: A Constitutional Analysis, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
779 (1985) (authored by Karen L. Sterchi). Several states have enacted restrictions on
alcoholic beverage advertising by relying on their regulatory powers under the twenty-
first amendment. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann § 561.42(10)-(12) (West 1987); Kan. Stat. Ann
§ 41-714 (Supp. 1988); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 138, § 24 (Law Co-op. 1971); Miss. Code
Ann. §§ 671-85 (1972 & Supp. 1989); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 37, § 516 (West Supp. 1968);
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-22 (1985). Several courts have upheld such restrictions
against constitutional attack. See, e.g., Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Mississippi, 718 F.2d
738 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding Mississippi ban), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984);
Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983) (upholding
Oklahoma ban), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Capital Cities Cable, Inc., 467 U.S. 691
(1984). For a recent Supreme Court decision suggesting that Congress may have the
power to ban alcoholic beverage advertising from the airwaves, or, at the very least,
mandate counteradvertising, see Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478
U.S. 328 (1986). See also Comment, supra note 149, at 1165-77 (discussing the implica-
tions of Posadas).
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casual connection between alcoholic beverage advertising and alco-
hol consumption.15' Numerous other studies have refuted these
findings, however.152 Furthermore, after a considered analysis of all
the available data, the Federal Trade Commission reported that
there is "no reliable basis on which to conclude that alcohol adver-
tising significantly affects alcohol abuse."' 153 Given the absence of
evidence that alcoholic beverage advertising has any significant ef-
fect on alcohol consumption, an advertising ban would be nothing
more than a cosmetic solution to a serious national health problem.
Only through an institutionally-based approach such as the one here
described will the American public have unrestricted access to a va-
riety of accurate educational materials necessary in the prevention
of alcohol abuse and alcoholism.
B. Basic Principles of Communications Theory
An institutionally-based approach to the prevention of alcohol
abuse and alcoholism is well supported by several basic principles of
communications theory.
1. Sender Characteristics
It is a well recognized principle of communications theory that
product safety information should be provided by the sender who
can do so most effectively. 154 Product manufacturers, therefore, will
not always be in the best position to design and distribute product
151 C. Atkin & M. Block, Content and Effects of Alcohol Advertising (1981) (unpub-
lished manuscript).
152 See, e.g., DAVID J. PITTMAN & M. Dow LAMBERT, ALCOHOL, ALCOHOLISM AND AD-
VERTISING: A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF ASSERTED ASSOCIATIONS 66 (1978) (alco-
holic beverage advertising has no significant effect on consumption); Paul M. Kohn &
Reginald G. Smart, The Impact of Television Advertising on Alcohol Consumption: An Experi-
ment, 45J. STUD. ALCOHOL 299 (1984) (found no scientific evidence indicating that alco-
holic beverage advertising has any significant impact on rate of alcohol misuse or
alcoholism); Strickland, Alcohol Advertising: Orientations and Influences, J. ADVERTISING 307,
318-19 (1982). For an excellent overview of the scientific research concerning the link
between alcoholic beverage advertising and consumption, see Wilcox, Shea & Hovland,
supra note 150, at 33-35 (empirical studies show lack of evidence linking bans on alco-
holic beverage advertising to reduced alcohol consumption).
153 Beer and Wine Advertising: Impact of the Electronic Media, Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 604 (1985).
154 The effectiveness of a communication is largely dependent upon the sender's
credibility, status and opinion leadership. ARNOLD E. SCHNEIDER, WILLIAM C. DONAGHY
& PAMELA JANE NEWMAN, ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION 93-96 (1975). These vari-
ables are thought to help change the attitude of the receiver and thus lead to a change in
behavior. See generally MARVIN KARLINS & HERBERT IRVING ABELSON, PERSUASION: How
OPINIONS AND ATrITUDES ARE CHANGED (2d ed. 1970). Cf Hochheimer, supra note 146,
at 312-14 (a credible, attractive and powerful source would be best for communicating
health education).
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safety information. A manufacturer separated from consumers by a
distribution system beyond its control may be unable to anticipate
and meet the informational and motivational needs of the product
user.155 Where the goal is to inform pregnant women of the health
risks associated with alcohol consumption, for instance, a physician
is the most effective and credible means through which such infor-
mation may be communicated. The legal system must therefore be
aware of those situations in which the product manufacturer is not
the best sender, both in formulating and applying the legal rules
regarding warnings liability.' 56
2. Receiver Characteristics
Effective and persuasive communication of product safety infor-
mation depends not only on the characteristics of the sender, but
also on the informational and motivational needs of the intended
receiver.' 57 As a practical matter, however, product warnings can-
not be adapted to the needs of each individual product user. Prod-
uct safety information must therefore be highly generalized and
directed at large and often diverse groups with whom the manufac-
155 Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 63. Manufacturers of prescription drugs and
medical devices, for example, are required to supply the prescribing physician with
safety information, not the patient to whom the drug is prescribed. See, e.g., Salmon v.
Parke Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975) (chloromycetin); Chambers v. G. D.
Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1975) (oral contraceptive); Stephens v. Parke
Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 507 P.2d 653 (1973) (chloromycetin);
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)
(oral contraceptive); Terhune v. A. H. Robins Co., 90 Wash. 2d 9, 577 P.2d 975 (1978)
(intrauterine contraceptive device). The reasoning behind this rule was well summa-
rized by the court in Terhune:
Where a product is available only on prescription or through the services
of a physician, the physician acts as a "learned intermediary" between the
manufacturer or seller and the patient. It is his duty to inform himself of
the qualities and characteristics of those products which he prescribes for
or administers to or uses on his patients, and to exercise an independent
judgment, taking into account his knowledge of the patient as well as the
product. The patient is expected to and, it can be presumed, does place
primary reliance upon that judgment.... It has also been suggested that
the rule is made necessary by the fact that it is ordinarily difficult for the
manufacturer to communicate directly with the consumer.
90 Wash. 2d at 14, 577 P.2d at 978.
156 Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 62.
157 See Hochheimer, supra note 146, at 321-22; Wilbur Schramm, How Communication
Works, in THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION 3, 6 (Wilbur Schramm ed.
1955); R. MARKIN, supra note 96, at 308; see also Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman,
340 F.2d 402, 405 (1st Cir. 1965) ("jury could reasonably have believed that defendant
should have foreseen that its admittedly dangerous product would be used by ... farm
laborers, of limited education and reading ability"); Ziglar v. E. E. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 53 N.C. App. 147, 280 S.E.2d 510 (1981) (decedent's contributory negligence in
mistaking poisonous liquid for water was a question for the jury).
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turer has no direct contact.158
Such generalizations are particularly inappropriate with respect
to alcoholic beverages, where a number of non-constant factors in-
fluence an individual's bodily reaction to the presence of alcohol.
Recent government studies have indicated that "[c]omplex interac-
tions of demographic, social, economic, and biological factors deter-
mine whether a person drinks, how much and how often that person
drinks, and what the individual response will be to alcohol." 159
Even age, sex and ethnic background are significant determinants of
a person's drinking patterns and susceptibility to drinking
problems. 160 To prevent and treat alcohol abuse and alcoholism
successfully, one must have a thorough knowledge and understand-
ing of these factors.
3. Media and Channels
The selection of the media and channels through which product
safety information will be made available to the consumer is an im-
portant consideration for communications theory.' 6 ' The most
common method of communicating such information is through
written warnings either attached to or otherwise accompanying the
product. 162 Where the number of risks associated with a product is
high, and the information necessary to avoid those risks complex
(such as with alcoholic beverages) written channels alone may be
158 Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 63; see also R. MARKIN, supra note 96, at 304-
05.
159 SIXTH SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 23.
160 Id.
161 See Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 64; see also Schramm, supra note 157, at
13; R. MARKIN, supra note 96, at 312 (discussing the elements of an effective message).
Professors Schwartz and Driver list three goals which should be kept in mind when se-
lecting the media and channels by which product safety information will be
communicated:
First, product safety information should be communicated via media that
are reasonably likely to be encountered by the product user at a time
when he is likely to be receptive to such information. Second, the media
and channels chosen should be capable of catching and holding the atten-
tion of the user long enough to communicate its message. Third, the
media and channels chosen should be designed to make the message ac-
cessible to the expected product user.
Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 64.
Recall that the temporary regulations promulgated by the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms require that the government warning be placed on a front, back or
side label and be at least 2 millimeters high for containers of more than eight fluid
ounces and at least one millimeter high for containers of eight fluid ounces or less. See
supra note 88. Given these requirements, it is unlikely that consumers will actually read
the government warning at all.
162 Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 64-65.
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ineffective.' 63 In such instances, face-to-face communication involv-
ing both oral and visual channels is preferable in that it allows both
the sender and the receiver of the communication to use more of
their senses in the process. 164 The objective of the warning and the
characteristics of the expected consumer must therefore inform the
choice of media and channels. 165
CONCLUSION
Almost all products involve some potential for harm, either in
their intended or reasonably foreseeable use. Alcoholic beverages
are no exception: the debilitating effects of alcohol abuse and alco-
holism are wide spread in this country. If the American public is
ever to cease being victimized by the drug alcohol, then it must be
well informed about the myriad health risks associated with its use.
Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co. was the first in a long line of decisions to
question the so-called "universal recognition" of the dangers of al-
cohol consumption. Yet the common-law approach to products lia-
bility, with its reliance on the jury, is inadequate to resolve the
question of an alcoholic beverage manufacturer's duty to warn con-
sumers of the health risks inherent in the use of its product. On the
one hand, juries often are inconsistent in finding a duty to warn. On
the other hand, assuming that such a duty exists, juries are ill-
equipped to assess the adequacy of the warning provided.
The Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988 (ABLA),
although providing a nonconfusing and nationally uniform product
safety warning, is equally ineffectual. The ABLA fails entirely as an
educational and informational device. Moreover, the government
warning provides only "selective" information to consumers, yet
preempts all common-law products liability actions for injuries re-
sulting from risks not addressed in the warning.
Where the goal is to inform the American public about the risks
associated with alcohol consumption, warning labels have proven to
be an inadequate information transfer mechanism. Even compre-
hensive warnings, given their societal costs and practical limits, are
of questionable efficacy. To successfully educate consumers about
163 Id. at 64; see John Pacilio, Jr., The Effect of 4fhree Methods of Instruction on Task Per-
formance, 1977 PROc. ACAD. MGMT. 380-84.
164 Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 65. See generally Charles A. O'Reilly & Louis
Pondy, Organizational Communication, in ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 119 (S. Kerr ed.
1979). The criteria for determining when face-to-face communication is appropriate in-
clude: "(1) the difficulty of the material, (2) the number of receivers, (3) the desire for
source-receiver interaction, (4) the personal preferences of the receiver, [and] (5) the
source of the message... " A. SCHNEIDER, W. DONAGHY & P. NEWMAN, supra note 154,
at 101.
165 Schwartz & Driver, supra note 35, at 65.
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the dangers of alcohol consumption and thereby influence their
drinking habits requires an "institutionally-based" approach-one
that combines a carefully designed mass media information cam-
paign with personalized behaviorial training provided through
schools at all levels, hospitals and other health maintenance organi-
zations. Ultimately, all warning mechanisms attempt to modify indi-
vidual behavior by providing accurate and convincing information
about the risks associated with a given activity. Only through an
institutionally-based approach will the American public have un-
restricted access to the necessary educational materials concerning
alcohol use and alcohol-related problem prevention.
Clarke E. Khoury
